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Abstract 
Call after call has been made over many years for more international regulation - in many 
different flavours - to limit the number of Antarctic tourists. The authors remain unconvinced by 
this approach. This report describes the weaknesses of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) and 
the challenges it will face as the number of tourists visiting Antarctica increases. It is shown that 
regulation of tourism operators under the ATS, as proposed in literature, is legally ambiguous 
and is unlikely to be enacted and/or enforced. The most likely evolution of regulation in this area 
is no regulation at all. An alternative evolutionary model of regulation is examined, where the 
tourism industry itself develops policies and procedures which maintain an authentic Antarctic 
tourist experience, based on a healthy Antarctic environment, the two being interdependent. 
The authors have adopted the term “emergent regulation’’ to describe a situation where 
regulatory and enforcement systems arise spontaneously to meet operators’ needs (and thus 
their customers’ demands) and to preserve their long term economic interests. 
Introduction 
This report considers the question of limiting the number and impact of tourists visiting 
Antarctica. It specifically attempts to address: 
1. whether some forms of tourism should be constrained before they are too big for the 
ATS to control, 
2. the factors that need to be considered to regulate tourism numbers, 
3. how to regulate the number of tourists visiting Antarctica, and 
4. what we might expect of regulation developed in the current and future political and 
economic environment. 
 
The first three harmless sounding questions are in fact fizzing with contradictions and 
assumptions that require careful defusing before any attempt can be made to tackle part four. 
For example if the answer to question one is negative, the others do not even arise. And if any 
component of any question is based on a faulty assumption, incomplete knowledge, or 
imperfect logic, then this will obviously affect the regulatory outcomes. 
 
By systematically dismantling the assumptions in this set of questions, we arrive at a potential 
solution that we hope will inform the debate on Antarctic tourism from a new point of view. The 
literature dealing with this debate is simply vast - and extraordinarily repetitive. Call after call has 
been made over many years for more regulation - in many different flavours - to limit tourism. 
We remain unconvinced by this approach. 
 
At the heart of this report is the question of what limiting tourism is designed to achieve. 
Regardless of how it is arranged, we consider the effect of both lesser and greater numbers of 
tourists visiting Antarctica. 
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An important consideration is the cultural, aesthetic and environmental values that inform the 
decision to restrict visitor numbers. The original ATS members broadly share traditional Western 
values and the existence of their permanent bases carries weight at Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meetings (ATCM). These values can be expected to differ from those of newer 
ATS member states. Even more pronounced differences are likely with non-members of the 
ATS who may wish to establish tourist facilities and who may think of ideas such as wilderness 
or environmental protection in ways that long-standing Antarctic participants find unfamiliar and 
threatening. 
 
In considering these issues it is important to keep in mind that Antarctic tourism is not a new 
phenomenon. As early as 4 November 1910 an advertisement was placed on the front page of 
the Christchurch Press newspaper offering a trip from Lyttelton to Antarctica to anyone with 
sufficient money, while Apsley Cherry-Gerrard famously paid £1000 to be a member of Scott’s 
1910 Terra Nova expedition1, a gift which enabled Scott to overlook both Cherry-Gerrard’s 
chronic myopia and his lack of experience. The amount he paid is equivalent today to almost 
one million New Zealand dollars2. 
Defining the obvious 
“we must know what we're talking about before we 
can talk about anything else regarding that thing” - 
Socrates as quoted by Plato, Phaedrus (c237 BC) 
Tourist 
The United Nations World Tourism Organization defines tourism as: 
 
The activities of persons travelling to and staying in places outside their usual environment for 
not more than one consecutive year for leisure, business and other purposes3.  
 
This extremely broad definition was devised to capture a wide range of activities that extend far 
beyond traditional holiday-making. It would include travel for the purposes of business, 
conventions, conferences, job exchanges, sabbaticals, temporary employment, internships, 
scientific field work, study, training, indeed, as the definition indicates any purpose at all. For the 
purposes of this review however, we will define tourist more narrowly and so exclude those 
                                                 
1 Cherry-Gerrard, A, 1922 
2Average nominal earnings increased from 0.686 in 1910 to 276.38 in 2009, where normalized for 
1987=100 (Officer, 2010). Therefore earnings of £1,000 in 1910 are equivalent to earnings of  £403,000 
in 2009. Using the average exchange rates from March to September 2009 of GB£1 to NZ$2.43 (Global 
Environment Facility, 2010), the equivalent money in 2009 would be NZ$979,290. 
3 UNWTO, 2005 
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participating in science programmes, political visitors and support staff working on national 
bases.  
 
It is our belief however that any system that does not, at a strategic level, subject all Antarctic 
visitors to the same legal and environmental treatment, is unlikely to work. We will return to the 
importance of treating all visitors alike later when we consider the possible decline in the 
dominance that scientists have hitherto enjoyed in setting the ground-rules in Antarctica. 
Scientists’ values and tourists’ values will naturally differ and to date it is the scientists’ values 
that have contributed to the regulatory framework. Political issues have, since 1959 been 
defused by using science as the continent’s currency, so it is hardly surprising that their values 
have taken precedence. 
 
The specific appeal of an Antarctic tourism experience has also been analysed, as part of the 
more general investigation into what motivates tourists overall. Motivations are numerous, 
diverse and complex. They overlap and may well be paradoxical. Escape, an authentic 
experience, a change from routine, marking new territory, physical activity, photography, 
experiencing new cultures languages and cuisines, contributing something to an environmental 
belief and social interaction may all play a part. Some of these cannot apply to an Antarctic 
experience, but most certainly do. It should be noted that the countless studies of tourism 
motivation that exist are usually conducted with the intention of exploiting them commercially 
with ever greater precision. 
Constraint 
In order to consider constraining some forms of tourism “before they are too big for the ATS to 
control” we need to consider a number of further questions: 
● Why should particular forms of tourism be singled out for constraint? 
● Which ones should these be? 
● Would form be based on mode of transport? 
● Would the constraint simply be numerical? Or based on some other factor? 
● Would the constraint be motivated only by a fear of seeing the ATS tested to breaking 
point? Or for some other policy or strategic reason? 
 
Constraints on an activity that a society as a whole finds undesirable are normally given effect 
through legislation, suitably enforced and with suitable sanctions for infringement. Sovereign 
governments employ policy analysts to develop policy and judicial officials to monitor and 
penalise those who infringe. The peculiar weakness of the Antarctic Treaty System to do any of 
this is discussed in detail below. Constraints that are based on sound policy and strategic 
thinking are normally accepted: we tolerate a driving speed limit because we know it is sound 
policy (driving more slowly is safer) and we know that it is part of an overarching government 




Constraints that lack strategic and policy purpose, or worse, which appear to serve the interests 
of a particular constituency, are problematic and the fundamental question here then is to define 
the strategic purpose and the policy goals that constraining tourist numbers would serve. 
Purposes that a restriction on activity could serve include such things as avoiding conflict, 
environmental preservation, ensuring longer-term returns on an investment or other longer term 
goals. 
 
Whenever imposing constraints, it must be realized that there will always be unforeseeable 
consequences that are, by their nature, unforeseeable. While thorough understanding of the 
situation and a sound, science-based discussion can prevent or minimize the undesirable 
impacts, in reality the process of enacting regulations is messy and political, relying on 
emotional reasoning and influence. It therefore can be more important that the regulation 
includes mechanisms to respond to emergent effects. An example of changing regulation in 
response to unforeseen consequences is the current restrictions on the use of DDT (Dichloro-
diphenyl-trichloroethane), used to control insect-borne diseases. DDT has been sprayed widely 
by many governments to reduce public diseases, and it was mandatory to “dust” all U.S. 
Marines in the Korean War4, however fears of its long term effects on the environment lead to 
bans in most countries and the natural and economic systems have slowly recovered. However 
the consequences of ceasing to use DDT are significant, with estimates that 20 million children 
have died of malaria due to the ban5 and 100,000 people per year die of Dengue fever6, and it 
has now been re-introduced in many places. The constraints in this case have thus changed 
from compulsory use to a blanket ban to various forms of “responsible use”. A system of 
constraints should not be seen as permanent, nor as a perfect solution. 
 
The third term that needs careful scrutiny is impact and to this we will devote an entire section. 
Impacts 
Tourist visitors to Antarctica are regularly categorized by the form of transport they use to get 
there. Other categorizations such as the amount of money they spent to get there, their 
nationality, their ability or commitment to advocate for Antarctic issues on returning home, and 
most important of all the environmental impact their visit had, would be equally valid 
categorization options7. 
 
The International Association of Antarctic Tour Operators (IAATO) summarises tourist visitor 
numbers to Antarctica, by season and by mode of transport. This is shown in the following 
table8. 
                                                 
4 Smith, 2007 
5 Finkel, 2007 
6 Davis, 2009 
7 www.iaato.org 




Year # of 
Operators or 
Charterers 
# of Ships & 
Yachts 




# of Cruise 
Only 
Passengers 
1992-93 10 12 59 6,704  
1993-94 9 11 65 7,957  
1994-95 9 14 93 8,098  
1995-96 10 15 113 9,212  
1996-97 11 13 104 7,322  
1997-98 12 13** 92* 9,473  
1998-99 15 15** 116 9,857  
1999-00 17 21** 154 13,687 936 
2000-01 15** 32** 131* 12,109 0 
2001-02 19** 37** 117* 11,429 2,029 
2002-03 26** 47** 136* 13,263 2,424 
2003-04 31** 51** 180* 19,369 4,949 
2004-05 35** 52** 207* 22,297 5,027 
2005-06 47** 44** 249* 25,167 4,632 
2006-07 42** 47** 268* 28,622 6,930 
2007-08 48* 55* 308* 32,637 13,015 
2008-09 44* 53* 290* 26,921 10,652 




               *   Does not include non-member operated yachts (sailing and motor). 
               ** Includes Member and non-member yachts (sailing and motor) where the information 
was available.   
 
Numbers are therefore certainly rising, but they remain tiny. Visitors to Spain typically range 
between 6 million and 13 million per month9.  
 
IAATO did calculate visitor numbers by nationality for the 2004/5 season: 
 
 
It has been calculated by Bauer10 that human activity in the Antarctic affects 0.005% of the 
continent’s area (705 km2 of 14,000,000 km2) and 0.25% of its ice-free area (705 km2 of 





An intangible benefit of tourism, and the reason that it exists, is the personal experience of the 
tourists who value these experiences more than the money they are prepared to pay for them. 
Also intangible is the effect of past tourists impact on the perceptions and debate, effectively 
acting as ambassadors for Antarctica. There are also, of course, some very tangible benefits to 
tourism. 
 
                                                 
9 www.ine.es viewed 11 January 2011 




The economic benefits to the host cities of Antarctic activities are not insignificant. Estimates of 
the impact on the economy of Christchurch are in the order of $150 million11, mostly from the 
national programs of the United States and New Zealand. 
 
The Antarctic tourism industry is estimated to be worth $120 million to the economy of Ushuaia 
in Argentina, representing a significant fraction of the local economy and creating thousands of 
local jobs12. 
 
Co-operation between tourism and science  
 
The activities of tourism and science in the past have often been complementary. For example, 
in 2008 Quark Expeditions came to the aid of ships loaded with supplies and fuel destined for 
US science program at McMurdo Station and the New Zealand science program at Scott Base. 
At the time the contracted ice breaker assigned to break a channel though the sea ice had 
experienced mechanical engine failure and the two icebreakers of the US navy where in dry 
dock. Quark assigned a cruise ship ice breaker to open a channel into the sound so that 
supplies and fuel could be delivered. 
 
This incident followed US programme coming to the aid of Quark Expeditions by transporting a 
sick passenger, in urgent need of medical attention, to the nearest surgically capable hospital. 
The US sent two Twin Otters aircraft, on contract from a Canadian company, to collect the 
passenger and doctor at Cape Adare and to bring them, via Terra Nova Station and McMurdo 
Station for their transport by plane to Christchurch. As well as breaking the channel to McMurdo 
Station, it was also witnessed that multiple barrels of fuel were transferred from the cruise ship 




The Aliens in Antarctica project found that the commonest vector for unintended dispersal of the 
propagules of alien species was not tourists but field scientists and tourist support personnel14 
while another study15 found numerous viable propagules being regularly transported to 
Antarctica to support scientific activity at the New Zealand, American and Italian national bases 
in the Ross Sea area. 
 
Two of the most serious biosecurity infringements in Antarctica have been at national bases: at 
the British station at Rothera16 and the Polish station at Arctowski17 while the five proven 
introductions of alien species are all in the vicinity of scientific research stations. Personal 
comments from participants in tourist activity on the Antarctic Peninsula indicate that tourism 
                                                 
11 Saunders, 2007 
12 McDonnell, 2007 
13 Laird, 2011 
14 ATCM, 2007, www.ats.aq 
15 Fortune, 2006 
16 Hughes, 2009 
17 Osyczka, 2010 
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operators take their environmental obligations very seriously by providing passengers with 
information and by enforcing rules strictly. 
 
We infer that tourists as such have a negligible impact on the Antarctic environment compared 
with national bases. A likely explanation is that tourists, especially first time tourists which most 
are, are likely to be conscientious observers of environmental guidelines while base staff, 
although perfectly familiar with such guidelines, are at risk of becoming complacent and 
inconsistent in their application.  
 
If tourism’s impact is so tiny while scientific stations’ impacts are so large (and permanent and 
therefore by definition cumulative), it seems reasonable to ask why so much energy and literary 
endeavour has been put into constraining tourism rather than into constraining existing and new 
stations? While tourism activity is flexible and can be quickly adjusted to meet new conditions, 
or indeed easily abandoned altogether, national bases are permanent, irreversible intrusions. 
 
It is highly likely that demand for Antarctic tourism will grow. This includes the traditional 
Antarctic tourism markets such as North America, Europe and Australia. This is as a result of 
growing affluence, aging populations and increasing awareness of Antarctica as a tourist 
destination. Economic developments and growing affluence in other parts of the world may 
create new markets for Antarctic experiences such as China and India.  At the same time the 
World Tourism Organization has projected growth in all global tourism market segments 
important for the Antarctic tourism industry, including nature-based tourism, adventure tourism 
and cruise tourism18.  
 
A final paradox when considering the impact of tourism in Antarctica is that breaking down 
tourist activity into smaller ships with fewer passengers per ship may in fact increase 
environmental impact. Larger ships, and particularly of course those that are too large to offer 
continental landings at all, have an even more modest environmental impact, yet satisfy a larger 
number of tourists. The same number of visitors spread across a greater number of vessels 
small enough to offer landings, will have a much greater local impact per visitor. Whether large-
ship visitors have had anything like an authentic Antarctic experience is debatable, but their visit 
has without question been low impact. Over flights are one step removed again: an even less 
authentic experience and an even lower environmental impact.  
Comparable situations 
There are many other sites where visitor numbers exceed or threaten to exceed the capacity of 
the site to accommodate them and to provide the experience the visitors have gone there to 
have. Famous sites that fit this description include Stonehenge in the United Kingdom, Milford 
Sound in New Zealand, Yosemite Valley in the United States and Macchu Pichu in Peru. 
                                                 
18 Bastmeijer, 2008 
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However all of these lie within sovereign states with mechanisms in place to develop policy, and 
more significantly to enforce it. 
 
An example would be the New Zealand Department of Conservation's 447 page Management 
Plan for the Fiordland National Park which is a sophisticated and complex plan for managing a 
park that includes some areas which are essentially never visited and others which are over-
visited . The Department of Conservation (DOC) is appointed to administer and manage the 
park within the National Park Act 1980 and Park Bylaws. The act stipulates that people can be 
restricted to park areas as necessary for the preservation of natural plants and animals19. The 
department can thus restrict numbers on a case-by-case basis, and has discretion as to how 
allocations of visitor permits are determined and distributed.  By-laws put in place control 
various activities in the park give the authority to DOC to act against persons who commit an 
offence, by way of monetary penalties. Ultimately, while DOC is able to issue fines for breaches 
of law, it is not able to force collection. Where a party fails to meet its obligations to pay the fines 
issued, it falls to the New Zealand police and the judiciary to enforce the requirement to pay, 
which may result in criminal charges should the non-payment warrant this course of action. 
 
However in the end Antarctica’s unique legal position makes comparisons with other heavily 
visited areas of doubtful value. The Antarctic tourism industry’s peculiar characteristics have 
been usefully summarised as: 
- the lack of a comprehensive framework for controlling and managing Antarctic tourism, 
- problems with the enforcement of existing rules and guidelines, 
- jurisdictional problems (flag-state jurisdiction) raised by tourism, 
- the hortatory but non-building nature of many tourist guidelines, 
- inconsistencies with respect to national enactment of Treaty provisions, and 
- a lack of data on the impacts of tourism activity20. 
Instruments and mechanisms 
The Antarctic Treaty System 
The Antarctic Treaty was signed in 1959 and provides Antarctica’s core administrative 
mechanism. It was set up as a response to conflicts among sovereign states claiming territory in 
Antarctica and at a time when it became apparent that there was potential for militarization in 
Antarctica between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union who  both  
had sizable interests there. Initially the aims of the Antarctic Treaty were to demilitarize 
Antarctica, promote freedom of scientific research and encourage international co-operation.  
Subsequently, in order to accommodate various needs and changing international 
                                                 
19 Department of Conservation, 2007 
20 Haase, 2006 
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circumstances, a mechanism has gradually evolved focusing on comprehensive environmental 
protection21. 
  
The  Antarctic Treaty includes within it a number of related agreements which together are 
called the Antarctic Treaty system. 
 
The other agreements which make up the system are: 
 
● the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (Madrid, 1991) 
● the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS, London, 1972) 
● the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR, 
Canberra, 1980)22 
 
Although CCAS and CCAMLR are independent agreements, they both contain provisions that 
commit their Parties to fundamental parts of the Antarctic Treaty such as Article IV which sets 
out the legal status of territorial claims. The Environment Protocol is open to accession only by 
Antarctic Treaty Parties23. 
 
The majority of the ATCM guidelines and regulations for tourists and expedition organizers can 
be found in the Environmental Protocol and Tourism Guidelines attached to Recommendation 
XVIII-1 (1994).  The ATCM establishes guidelines for tourist expeditions and also provides for 
tourist expeditions to submit reports on their visits. The ATCM also issue specific guidelines for 
the sites most visited by tourists, which  includes practical advice for tour operators on the 
appropriate conduct for any particular site taking into account their environment24. 
 
Currently effective control over tourist and non-governmental expeditions to the Antarctic has 
not been established. It has been suggested that this stems from the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Parties’ hortatory approach and its limited ability to apply sanctions. When tourism 
issues extend beyond the scope of the Protocol, for example when dealing with issues such as 
liability, insurance, jurisdiction, third party activities, and enforcement, a vacuum of space in 
regulation is observed. There is a continuing failure to resolve the matter25. 
 
There is no agreed approach between the Consultative Parties as to the exercise of jurisdiction 
over tourism.  However there has been progress with regard to providing guidelines for tour 
operators and tourists since Recommendation XVIII-1 was adopted in 1994.  Nevertheless 
because of the non-mandatory nature and the unique political and jurisdictional basis, there are 
significant difficulties in achieving effective regulation.  As a result, the administrative capacity of 
                                                 
21  Lee, 2005 
22 www.ats.aq 
23 Lee, 2005 
24 Ibid at 18 
25 Ibid at  17 
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the Antarctic Treaty System with regard to tourism management continues to be seriously 
challenged26.  
Enforcement 
Currently the enforcement regime of the Antarctic Treaty is considered weak, as it lacks punitive 
measures in cases of infringement. For example, in the Protocol, the Environmental Protection 
Committee has been criticized as lacking real authority to enforce compliance. It has been 
suggested that this weakness in the ATS is due to the lack of clear jurisdictional authority. After 
all who is in charge and responsible in Antarctica, when the guidelines and rules are broken? 
For laws to be successful in achieving their intended objectives a clearly defined enforcement 
mechanism must be established; it must be able to do what it is intended to do and have the 
requisite legal power to actually enforce sanctions.  It is the same with respect to the Antarctic 
Treaty System. In CCAMLR and the Protocol, the mechanism of sanction is that of ‘observation 
and inspection’ with no uniform ability to sanction worldwide for breaches found resulting from 
any observations and inspections27.  
It seems essential that a solution on this matter is reached. A robust liability regime for 
infringements needs to be introduced to the Antarctic Treaty System. Liability regimes have 
been discussed and talked about for nearly twenty years at Antarctic Treaty meetings. And to 
date there has been no agreement on how and when this should take place, or in fact what 
sanctions might be applied28. 
Port-state regulation 
There are five ports of departure for Antarctic cruises, namely Cape Town in South Africa, 
Hobart in Australia, Christchurch in New Zealand, Punta Arenas in Chile and Ushuaia in 
Argentina. Due to the Antarctic Peninsula’s proximity, 90% of passengers on cruises to the 
Antarctic (who in turn make up 93% of tourists to the Antarctic) pass through the city of 
Ushuaia29. This is driven both by the financial incentive to tour operators, who would otherwise 
need to pass on fuel, food and staff costs to their passengers. It is in the interests of tourists to 
acquire their Antarctic experience at the lowest cost, both in terms of time and money. 
 
Because of this transport bottle-neck, it has been proposed that the governments of port cities 
(the so-called Port States) could enact appropriate laws that would successfully regulate 
Antarctic Tourism. This would bypass the lengthy process of gaining consensus amongst all 
parties to the ATS30. 
 
The United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)31 gives every nation rights and 
obligations with regards to vessel registration and freedom of passage both over the high seas 
                                                 
26 Ibid at 17 
27 Ibid at 17 
28 Ibid at 17 
29 Monowitz, 2007 
30 Ibid at 29 
31 http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm 
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and through individual nations’ coastal waters. Some of these responsibilities are detailed in 
International Conventions developed and amended by the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO). These include: 
● International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). 
● International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL). 
● International Convention on Load Lines. 
● International Convention on the Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping 
for Seafarers (STCW). 
 
There are also numerous technical Codes and Resolutions associated with these 
Conventions32. 
 
The administration offering vessel registration is referred to as the "flag state" and it holds the 
responsibilities and obligations imposed by the International Conventions for ships entitled to fly 
its flag as the signatory to the International Convention. The various international conventions 
and UNCLOS also grant legal powers to countries to which ships travel. This is to ensure that 
those ships do not pose an unreasonable threat to the safety of the ship, its crew or the marine 
environment whilst in their waters. The country in whose waters a ship travels is known as the 
"port state"33. The international conventions allow the port state to exercise a limit of control over 
ships in their waters. This mechanism of verifying that ships are compliant whilst in their waters 
is known as "port state control" (PSC). PSC has gained prominence in the shipping industry. 
This has come about by continuing breaches of obligations by the responsible party and the 
need to prosecute ships committing offences in ports or coastal state maritime zones. This is a 
potential way of regulating the behaviour of ships in and around Antarctica34.  
 
However it comes with obvious drawbacks, as ships could pick and choose their ports and could 
simply change ports that are considered less rigorous in applying laws, or have laws that are of 
a lower standard than other ports35,36. 
 
 
While the political nature of law-making remains, the requirement for reaching consensus at an 
international level is reduced. The concentration of operators in Ushuaia suggests that 
Argentina could act unilaterally to impose regulations and monitoring that would effectively apply 
to a significant majority of the industry. 
 
However it comes with obvious drawbacks, as ships could pick and choose their ports and could 
simply change ports that are considered less rigorous in applying laws, or have laws that are of 
a lower standard than other ports , . At a minimum it would require Argentina and Chile to align 
their regulations, and preferably all five port states. This takes us back into a regime of 
                                                 
32 Ibid at 26 
33 http://www.fao.org/fishery/psm/en, Food and Agriculture organization of the United Nations 
34 Ibid at 28 
35 Ibid at 28 
36 Ibid at 29 
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international treaties and agreements, however the reduced number of participants significantly 
increases the likelihood of consensus and common enforcement. 
 
Forces acting to undermine the multi-nation political consensus and enforcement include 
• Economic benefits accusing to port cities are significant, and can dominate the economy 
of the port cities. This may create political pressure through the representatives of that 
area. It may also encourage local officials to turn a blind eye to some activities. 
• Increased tourist activity between a country and Antarctica may be seen a justification to 
support that country’s sovereignty claims, and that anything that could limit that activity 
may be rejected on strategic geo-political grounds. 
• Operators should be expected to shop around for the best deal, and to lobby for their 
own interests, taking advantage of these pressures. 
 
Even if successful, the inevitable loopholes and inconsistencies of the application of national law 
to Antarctica and the high seas can be exploited to avoid complying with regulations. Flying to 
Antarctica would also make it easier to avoid regulations, as aircraft can more easily depart from 
different countries. This activity would be nothing new, as there are already jet charter flights 
operated from Punta Arenas to Union Glacier and previous to Patriot Hills, both inland from the 
Antarctic Peninsular (Antarctic Logistics & Expeditions, 2010). It is also important to note that 
port-state regulation would have very little application to any permanent land-based tourist 
facilities. 
Enacting and enforcing regulations 
Before making recommendations as to the nature and content of desirable regulatory 
mechanisms, it is important to consider the means and process by which such mechanisms can 
be brought into effect, and similarly the means and process by which the requisite powers of 
enforcement are to be realized. As the enactment of any recommendations is entirely 
dependent on these means and processes, it should be considered that the value of any 
recommendations that are provided without such a discussion is highly questionable. 
Unfortunately this point has been overlooked by most authors. 
Regulation 
Enactment of regulatory mechanisms in the Antarctic region has a long history through the 
Antarctic Treaty System. The process of enacting regulations through the ATS is summarized in 





Effective international regulation requires reaching a consensus amongst all nations. This is 
usually a complex diplomatic task that can take decades to achieve. 
 
Every internationally negotiated treaty is different and has its own distinct characteristics. 
Reaching agreement in the first place is difficult; submitting agreements to national 
governments for ratification is difficult, with competing interests working to obtain the best 
arrangements for their own purposes. From CCAMLR meetings being controlled by fishing 
companies, to lobby groups campaigning against restrictions on carbon emissions, to 
Government’s balancing all the programs they are trying to fund and enact, the difficulty of 
reaching an international agreement on anything should not be underestimated. 
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The Montreal Protocol controlling the use of CFCs is a rare example of an agreement that was 
quickly enacted, but in this case there were simple, relatively cheap and acceptable alternatives 
readily at hand. 
 
Multi-lateral agreements on bigger issues such managing debt, or relieving poverty, or 
controlling disease are altogether more challenging. 
Non-government Regulation 
It is worth considering some forms of regulation that do not derive from government statute. 
These include: 
 
● Contracts with landholders and between interest groups - though these may ultimately 
be enforced by the threat of physical violence (police and military) from a nation state. 
● The statements and actions of non-government entities that are prepared to use 
violence and force, or are able to compel others to use violence and force on their 
behalf. It should be noted that these entities may resemble governments in many ways, 
and while they may not initially participate in international legal regimes it is not 
uncommon that, should they persist for many years, they become governments de facto, 
if not de jure.  
● Industry codes of conduct, for which compliance is typically non-mandatory 
● Societal norms, mores and taboos 
 
There are a number of examples of emergent regulation in early colonial societies, where the 
rule of law emerged from within communities themselves at the earliest stages of their 
development. The gold rush in the American West provides many good examples where 
competition for relatively scarce resources (i.e. the gold) led to emergent regulation. In these 
cases it was recognized to be economically advantageous for the miners to commit time and 
money to developing and enforcing a set of rules that protected their diggings and wealth from 
interlopers and robbers. Interestingly, where the gold was sufficiently plentiful, regulations failed 
to develop because taking time away from digging for the gold was too high a price to pay.37 
 
When the expansion of the government functions of the United States of America eventually 
reached these communities the local regulations were not suplanted, but rather adopted to 
become local laws withing the union.38 
Enforcement 
While regulation has a mostly successful history, albeit on a long time scale, unfortunately the 
same cannot be said for enforcement. 
 
Enforcement boils down to combinations of: 
                                                 




● physical violence, or a credible threat of physical harm or forced restraint; 
● economic violence, or a credible threat of financial harm 
● social violence, or a credible threat to social standing and personal relationships. 
 
Typical enforcement of international government regulation is through national regulation, 
backed by the monopoly of a government on physical violence through its police and military. 
 
Enforcement requires monitoring which in Antarctica is particularly difficult as fishing regulators 
will testify. Areas are vast, access is difficult, and weather is unpredictable. The rewards of 
illegal fishing have repeatedly been worth the low risk of being caught. 
 
In some circumstances, the law can be enforced through the flag state. The issue is that various 
states will issue a flag for a fee with no real interest in how that ship’s operator carries out its 
activities. These are called flags of convenience 39and the reason for the use of a flag of 
convenience is that when a ship’s operator is sanctioned it is the home nation’s law that applies. 
Unscrupulous operators will obviously prefer to fly the flag of a nation less likely to enforce 
penalties against them. For this reason most cruise ships fly flags of countries other than the 
USA, most commonly those of developing nations, as the American system is seen to have the 
highest standards and to be more ready to apply harsh sanctions, either economic or criminal, 
for breaches of the Antarctic Treaty. 
 
When a breach of the CCAMLR convention occurs, it is the flag state’s responsibility to take any 
legal action and to apply any consequent sanctions. In the case of the Convention for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Seals it is apparent it provides for flag-state jurisdiction as the only 
grounds for enforcement40.  
 
Nevertheless, in today’s international setting, it is difficult to envisage a wholly effective regime 
enforced only by a state’s jurisdiction over vessels sailing under its flag.  The best example of 
this is an operator who operates in Antarctic waters but uses a ship which flies a flag of a state 
which is not an Antarctic Treaty member. In this case, should the operator carry out 
questionable activities, the non-member state, which provided the flag of convenience, is not 
obliged to enforce the Antarctic Treaty System. Further any effort by a member state to enforce 
sanctions against an operator working under a non-member flag would undoubtedly be highly 
problematic. If such a scenario were to occur it would most likely be a first world country trying 
to involve itself in the affairs of a third world nation. 
 
This confusion would be further compounded as most businesses which carry out tourism in 
Antarctica are based in first world nations. So the question then arises of whether any action is 
taken in the country where the operator has its headquarters, or in the country providing the flag 
becomes “Who carries out the sanctions? It is hard to imagine, say, the USA standing back and 
watching while an American company, which used Panamanian ships, broke the Antarctic 
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Treaty, simply because the Panamanians held jurisdiction over the ship through a flag of 
convenience41. This issue is not limited to Antarctic cruise ships, indeed is even more 
problematic in the area of fishing. Under the CCAMLR convention the fishing of the Patagonian 
toothfish is controlled, and a register of ships involved in illegal fishing is maintained. In 2001 
ships flying flags from Belize, Indonesia, Panama, St Vincent and the Grenadines were 
identified as being involved in the toothfish trade. None of these countries has ratified CCAMLR, 
so cannot be sanctioned for being involved in the activity. All that can be done is to provide the 
flag state with the information that the ship has been involved in those actions and leave it to 
that state to decide whether or not it will deal with the ships’ operators. But even ships operating 
out of CCAMLR contracting countries have been found to be involved in toothfish fishing and 
trading. This non-compliance by member states makes it even harder to approach non-member 
states in regards to their own ships’ activities42. 
 
Finally there is the issue of re-flagging. Re-flagging occurs when a ship, which previously flew a 
member state flag, has moved its registration to a non-member country. Ostensibly this is done 
for innocent reasons but in reality it is done most often in an attempt to avoid sanctions resulting 
from their involvement in activities which would be contrary to international law obligations that 
the original flag state were bound to adhere to. This aggravates the difficulties in enforcing the 
CCAMLR convention, solely using flag-states jurisdiction43. 
Non-government enforcement 
It is useful to consider types of enforcement that do not rely on the threat of physical violence by 
a branch of a national government. 
 
Firstly we shall consider the use and threat of physical violence by non-government actors. This 
could take the form of an entity that uses violence in a similar way to that which we are 
accustomed to seeing from national government. In a similar manner to a police or defence 
force, who have an effective monopoly on the use of force in western countries, we have seen 
the use of contract security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, even by the worlds largest and most 
powerful governments. 
 
It is theoretically possible that a non-governmental organization could use violence, and the 
threat of violence, to enforce regulations regarding Antarctic tourism, be that regulation 
documented or undocumented, be that regulation approved, formally or informally, by a national 
government or not, be that regulation to the benefit or detriment of the tourist experience, the 
business interest, the environment or the politician. Such an organization could choose to carry 
out the enforcement with its own people, or to contract such “services” to a security contractor. 
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There are examples of contracting violence in the western world, such as hiring private security 
firms to enforce property rights and restrict access. While domestic security firms operate under 
the laws of the state in which they are situated, they are often able to enforce regulations that go 
beyond those of the state, or that the enforcement branch of the government is unable or 
unwilling to enforce. 
 
There are examples of violent enforcement being privately contracted in failed states, such as 
Iraq and Afghanistan, where the state is not able to enforce laws and contractors and their 
customers can thus effectively define the regulations themselves. 
 
And there are examples of non-government organizations developing an enforcement strategy 
such as the direct action undertaken by Greenpeace or the Sea Shepherd Conservation 
Society. While this can be mostly described as economic violence, there is nonetheless a 
credible threat of physical harm to the crew of the whaling ships. While the Sea Shepherd 
Conservation Society operates from facilities within state borders, and is in fact registered in the 
USA, it operates internationally and often benefits from the inconsistencies of national and 
international laws. It is worth noting that the actions of the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society 
may in fact be enforcing regulations or policies of national governments that are unable to 
enforce them themselves, due to the constraints of international politics and the international 
treaty system. 
 
Finally there are examples of social violence where pressure is applied to achieve a particular 
goal. The Sea Shepherd Conservation Society does this as well, raising awareness of Japanese 
hunting and consumption of whales; however the success varies depending on the cultural 
context of its target. In fact the Japanese people have often expressed support for their whaling 
organizations as a result of the publicity campaign by Sea Shepherd. This highlights one of the 
risks of using this enforcement mechanism beyond a local group. 
Discussion 
The complexities of the Antarctic situation: judicial, political and physical, mean that a system of 
imposed regulations to manage the impacts of tourist, via tourist numbers or otherwise, is 
feasible though extremely unlikely. Specifically it will require: 
 
● universal political consensus and the political will to implement regulation, 
● granting of legal jurisdiction to a single, internationally recognized body, and 
● an armed international enforcement agency. 
 
This solution appears in the literature in the form of a limited world government in Antarctica .  
Such an administration of Antarctic affairs would comprise a single authority with one legal 
system and one justice system. The International Court of Justice and/or other mandated 
tribunals would be vested with the requisite powers to impose criminal and civil sanctions.  Any 
offences, whether environmental or individual, could be brought before these judicial bodies. 
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While inheriting the systems and regulations of the Antarctic Treaty System, such a system 
would not be consensual, and states would be required to recognize its effective sovereignty 
over the Antarctic. This would allow legislation to be passed swiftly, responding to the current 
issues in a timely manner with real and powerful sanctions, and would remove problems with 
inconsistent compliance amongst nations . 
 
Antarctic tourism is currently small, with most activity in Ushuaia only generating $120 million 
44and not likely to become “too big” for an international body to control. However, the issues 
surrounding Antarctica may be “too contentious” to achieve the required consensus for 
regulation, let alone enforcement. 
 
Given an ongoing legal limbo and regulatory vacuum, we have explored a system of self-
regulation that is likely to emerge, based ultimately on tourism operators’ self interest and 
market forces. We characterize this as emergent regulation, where regulation emerges from 
within the sectoral interest group which it is designed to control, rather than being imposed from 
without. It is, after all, in the best interests of tourism operators to provide tourists with the 
product they want and not to risk that product’s destruction. Furthermore it has been suggested 
that tourism operators involved in the decision making process are more likely to be committed 
to the outcome of that process. 
 
The nature of emergent regulation, and the balance it strikes in managing positive and negative 
impacts, will reflect the cultural values of the customers (tourists), and respond to these values if 
they should change. It is implicit that the largely scientific values of the original ATS countries 
are likely to be supplanted by tourists’ values from new cultures and countries. There is no 
“intrinsic right” that ATS members have to exclude the opinions of others, and due to the 
complexities of the ATS there is no way for any exclusion to be enforced. 
 
Self-regulation will rely on social and cultural values for enforcement. While there is a growing 
body of work on the attitudes of Western countries towards Antarctica, it should be realized that 
the growing wealth in Asia, and the fact that Asia makes up 60% of the world’s population, will 
result in greater numbers of tourists from that region bringing with them their social values and 
that these can differ substantially from those of Westerners. 
 
Considering the economic requirements for emergent regulation, we have noted that emergent 
regulation will only come into being when it is in the economic interest of the affected parties45. 
Antarctic tourism is definitely not a gold rush, and the “product” that is being sold is definitely in 
danger of being degraded, affecting the incomes of the operators.  
 
Similar to the situation that evolved in the American West, it is likely that the regulations that 
emerge in Antarctica will later be adopted by any regulatory body that replaces the initial 
industry association. This could be an international organization such as the ATS, that would 
likely absorb the regulations and enforcement mechanisms that have developed. Alternatively 
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the industry association itself may evolve into an officially recognized body with rights over 
Antarctic territory. Either way, the arrangement is likely to begin to have the attributes of a 
nation state. 
Conclusion 
To adopt effective regulation and enforcement mechanisms to manage Antarctic tourism, the 
Antarctic Treaty System requires universal political consensus, granting of legal jurisdiction and 
an armed international enforcement agency. This is unlikely to occur. 
 
Port-state regulation has a higher likelihood of being implemented, however the inevitable 
loopholes and inconsistencies of the application of national law to Antarctica and the high seas 
can be exploited to avoid complying with regulations  
 
In the absence of any other effective regulation, we can expect to see self-regulation emerge 
from within the sectoral interest group, and the adoption of increasingly aggressive means of 
enforcement. The regulations adopted will reflect the values of the customers, in this case the 
tourists. In the long run the regulations thus implemented will likely be adopted by any 
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